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plan the following year. Our results suggest that shareholder votes have little substantive impact 
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Introduction 
Enhancing shareholders’ ability to influence corporate policy has been the focus of 
several recent efforts to reform corporate governance, such as requirements for binding votes on 
stock-based compensation plans, mandatory reporting of mutual fund voting, “vote-no” 
campaigns, calls for elimination of broker non-votes, and legislation requiring advisory “say on 
pay” votes and proxy access. Much of this regulatory activity and debate is predicated on the 
notion that shareholder voting actually influences corporate behavior (e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act). Although shareholder voting has been the subject 
of some prior research (e.g., Cai, Garner, and Walkling, 2009; Choi, Fisch, and Kahan, 2011), 
the effectiveness of shareholder voting as a mechanism to effect changes in corporate policy 
remains an open and controversial question. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the efficacy of shareholder voting in effecting 
changes in corporate policy. We focus on the effects of shareholder voting on equity-based 
compensation plans on firms’ executive compensation policies for two reasons. First, equity 
compensation plans are widespread and require shareholder approval, making votes on these 
plans the most common subject of shareholder voting after director elections and auditor 
ratification. Second, equity compensation proposals attract much higher levels of shareholder 
disapproval than most other company-sponsored proposals that are put to shareholder vote (e.g., 
director elections and auditor ratification nearly always receive in excess of 90% shareholder 
support), making them a more powerful setting for empirical analysis. Of the 619 management-
sponsored proposals rejected by shareholders between 2001 and 2010, 183 (30%) related to 
  
- 2 - 
equity compensation plans.
1
 For the 2,659 management-sponsored proposals where Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS), a leading proxy advisory firm, recommended a vote against the 
proposal, 1,719 (65%) related to equity compensation plans. Moreover, ISS recommended 
against 27% of the 6,270 equity compensation plans considered between 2001 and 2010. 
Although only 2% of equity compensation proposals fail to receive the required level of 
shareholder support, this is substantially larger than the 0.07% failure rate for director elections, 
which have received considerably greater attention in recent research on shareholder voting and 
executive compensation.
2
 
Yermack (2010, 2.13) argues that “circumstantial evidence suggests that many firms have 
reacted to the rising tide of negative votes [for share authorization] by scaling back their equity 
compensation plans.” However, there is little rigorous systematic evidence of such an effect. In 
this paper, we provide direct evidence on this issue by examining the effect of shareholder votes 
for, and the outright rejection of, equity pay plans on firms’ executive compensation policies. 
We first examine the determinants of shareholder support for proposed equity pay plans. 
In contrast to prior research that examines votes for individual directors (e.g., Cai et al., 2009; 
Fischer et al., 2009), shareholder sentiment regarding firms’ executive compensation policies 
should be more directly reflected in their votes for equity pay plans. We find evidence that 
measures of “excess” compensation and shareholder dilution that are similar to those used by 
proxy advisors (e.g., ISS and Glass Lewis) and institutional investors (e.g., Fidelity Investments) 
                                                 
1
 Statistics based on data obtained from the ISS Voting Analytics database. 
2
 Shareholders rejected 1.3% of management-sponsored proposals that do not relate to equity compensation plans 
during our sample period from 2001 to 2010. 
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are negatively related to shareholder support for equity compensation plans.
3
 However, these 
same measures have no association with shareholder support in director elections that occur at 
the same annual meeting. These findings suggest that shareholder voting on equity pay plans is a 
more likely channel than director voting for shareholders to express their sentiment about firms’ 
executive compensation policies. 
We then examine whether shareholder support for equity pay plans has an impact on 
firms’ future compensation policies. This analysis is complicated because it is difficult to 
determine a priori the precise timing or elements of future compensation that should be affected 
by shareholder voting. Accordingly, we examine a variety of compensation measures over 
different horizons. In general, we find little evidence that shareholder voting support for equity 
pay plans affects future CEO compensation. Moreover, although not the primary focus of our 
paper, we do not observe a positive association between shareholder support in director elections 
and future compensation. 
Given the endogenous nature of the relationship between shareholder voting support and 
CEO compensation, we supplement our cross-sectional regressions with two alternative research 
designs. First we employ instrumental variable (IV) regressions using ISS voting 
recommendations as an instrument for shareholder support. Given ISS’s expressed policy of 
formulating its recommendation from a limited information set based on proxy filings made 
before shareholders vote, we argue that these recommendations provide a plausible source of 
exogenous variation in shareholder votes.
4
 Consistent with the results of our cross-sectional 
                                                 
3
 For discussion of the policies of ISS, Fidelity Investments, and other proxy advisors and institutional investors, see 
http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/RMGExplorationsPayEquityCompensationPlans20080520.pdf 
(accessed November 14, 2010). 
4
 The validity of this instrument depends on ISS recommendations not having an influence on future compensation 
decisions conditional on shareholder support (i.e., that firms listen to their shareholders, with ISS having only an 
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regression analysis, the IV estimates also indicate that there is no relation between shareholder 
voting on compensation proposals and subsequent changes in CEO compensation. 
Our second approach for addressing endogeneity is regression discontinuity design 
(RDD), which exploits the discrete nature of the level of voting support required for approval of 
an equity compensation plan (typically 50%). With relatively minor assumptions, RDD allows us 
to estimate an unbiased treatment effect, even when the shareholder voting is jointly determined 
with future compensation outcomes. Since these proposals are formally binding, they provide a 
more powerful setting for observing the effects, if any, of shareholder rejection of company-
sponsored proposals. However, consistent with our earlier findings, the results from our RDD 
analysis provide virtually no evidence that failing to receive shareholder approval for an equity 
pay plan has an effect on subsequent executive compensation. 
Given that shareholder votes on equity pay plans are binding in the sense that a failed 
vote deprives boards of the ability to grant the requested shares for compensation purposes, the 
lack of an effect on future equity-based compensation is puzzling. One possible explanation is 
that management responds to the rejection of a proposed equity pay plan by requesting additional 
shares in the subsequent year. To the extent that shareholders approve such requests, the total 
effect of shareholder rejection on equity-based compensation may be negligible. We examine 
this possibility and find that firms whose plans are rejected by shareholders are significantly 
more likely to request shares in the subsequent year. However, we find that the level of 
shareholder approval for these follow-up requests is not related to whether the original request 
was approved. This finding highlights the need to examine executive compensation and 
                                                                                                                                                             
indirect impact on corporate policies through their influence on shareholders’ voting decisions). To the extent this 
condition does not hold, the traditional exclusion restriction that is required for instrumental variable estimation is 
invalid. As we discuss in more detail below, we assess the sensitivity of our IV inferences to relaxing this exclusion 
assumption. 
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shareholder voting over multiple periods, as even if shareholder voting had an immediate effect, 
it might have little or no long-term effect. 
Collectively, our findings are at odds with those of prior research, as they suggest that 
shareholder sentiment expressed through voting support does not affect firms’ executive 
compensation policies. Our findings also suggest that recent regulatory efforts, which focus on 
strengthening shareholders’ ability to affect corporate policy through shareholder voting, 
particularly in the context of executive compensation, may not have the desired effect on firm 
policies. 
I. Prior research 
A. Voting and executive compensation 
This study is related to two papers that examine shareholder votes on equity 
compensation plans. Morgan, Poulsen, and Wolf (2006) examine aggregate shareholder votes for 
S&P 500 firms from 1992 to 2003 and find evidence that shareholders provide less support for 
plans that are more dilutive and plans that receive negative recommendations from a proxy 
advisor. However, the focus of that paper differs from ours, as Morgan et al. (2006) do not 
examine the consequences of shareholder voting and shareholder approval of equity pay plans 
was not mandatory during their sample period. Martin and Thomas (2005) examine stock price 
reactions to management-sponsored executive-only stock option plans and find a negative 
reaction to plans with higher levels of potential dilution. Martin and Thomas (2005) also 
examine the effect of voting outcomes on subsequent compensation and find evidence consistent 
with directors responding to negative shareholder votes by reducing future executive 
compensation. However, they find no association between shareholder support for stock option 
plans and future stock option grants. 
  
- 6 - 
Several recent studies have examined the effect of other types of shareholder voting on 
various aspects of firms’ executive compensation policies. For example, Fischer et al. (2009) 
examine the effect of shareholder support for the board and CEO in uncontested director 
elections on compensation. They find evidence of a positive relation between future excess 
compensation and shareholder support for CEOs standing for election, but no statistically 
significant relation when shareholder support is measured as the median ratio of votes "for" to 
total votes cast across all directors standing for election. Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2009) also 
focus on uncontested director elections and find that, for firms with positive abnormal CEO 
compensation in the year of the vote, future abnormal CEO compensation is decreasing in the 
level of shareholder support for directors that serve on the compensation committee. However, 
this association does not hold for directors in general or for directors that are not members of the 
compensation committee. In addition, Cai et al. (2009) find a negative relation between 
shareholder support for directors and both subsequent CEO turnover and the removal of takeover 
protection mechanisms such as poison pills and classified boards. Collectively, prior research 
finds modest evidence of a positive relation between shareholder support and future CEO 
compensation. 
In August 2002, the United Kingdom (UK) introduced the Directors’ Remuneration 
Report Regulations 2002, which require publicly traded UK firms to include an executive pay 
report in their annual filing and to submit this report to a shareholder vote at the annual meeting 
(similar to say-on-pay votes required under recent US legislation, these votes are advisory rather 
than binding). Two recent papers examine the effects of these regulations. Ferri and Maber 
(2011) find that firms that receive low levels of shareholder support are more likely to amend 
their executives’ compensation contracts in ways that are viewed as more “shareholder friendly” 
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(e.g., removing or reducing severance payments). Carter and Zamora (2009) examine the 
determinants of shareholder support in say-on-pay votes and find evidence that higher levels of 
dilution from equity compensation are associated with lower levels of shareholder support. They 
also examine the consequences of low shareholder support and find modest evidence of a 
negative relation between shareholder support and future CEO pay. 
In the US, Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (Pub. L. 111-203, H.R. 4173, the “Act”) amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to 
require companies subject to the federal proxy rules to provide shareholders with an advisory 
vote on executive compensation.
5
 These votes are required at least once every three years 
beginning with the first annual shareholder meeting on or after January 21, 2011. Cai and 
Walkling (2009) study the passage of the Say-on-Pay Bill—from which the Dodd-Frank Act 
derives—by the US House of Representatives. They find that the firms that are most likely to 
benefit from such legislation have positive announcement-period stock returns. Larcker, 
Ormazabal, and Taylor (2011) apply an event study methodology to events leading up to the 
passage of say on pay and proxy access legislation and find evidence consistent with proxy 
access diminishing shareholder value.
6
 
One important potential limitation of say on pay is that the result of the vote has no 
binding effect on the board. In contrast, if shareholders reject a proposed equity compensation 
plan, the board cannot issue the options or shares that would have been authorized under the new 
plan. Accordingly, if the primary role of the shareholder vote is to prevent actions from being 
taken, votes on equity compensation plans should have a greater impact on future compensation 
                                                 
5
 Section 971 of the Act also relates to shareholder voting. This section authorizes the SEC to issue rules permitting 
the use by a shareholder of proxy solicitation materials supplied by an issuer for the purpose of nominating directors. 
6
 Prior to this legislation, very few US firms had voluntarily conducted say-on-pay votes in 2008 and 2009. 
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than say-on-pay votes.
7
 
B. Effect of institutional shareholder activism 
Another stream of literature examines the efficacy of shareholder activism in effecting 
changes in corporate policy. Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke (2008) provide evidence that firms 
respond to campaigns by activist institutional investors to “just vote no” with operating 
performance improvements, greater CEO turnover, and governance changes. Bushee, Carter, and 
Gerakos (2010) find evidence that firms with a high level of ownership by governance-sensitive 
institutions exhibit significant future improvements in shareholder rights, consistent with an 
effect of shareholder activism. Morgan et al. (2010) examine mutual fund voting on shareholder 
proposals and find that greater support by funds leads to a greater likelihood of a proposal’s 
passage and a greater likelihood of its subsequent implementation by management. 
More closely related to our paper is Ertimur, Ferri, and Muslu (2010), who study “vote 
no” campaigns and shareholder proposals related to executive pay between 1997 and 2007. 
Ertimur et al. (2010) find that voting support for the proposal (i.e., lower support for 
management) is higher at firms with higher (excess) CEO pay. They also find that CEOs with 
excess pay who are targeted by vote-no campaigns receive lower future compensation. 
This paper contributes to the literature on shareholder voting and corporate governance 
by examining a comprehensive sample of binding shareholder votes on management-sponsored 
executive compensation proposals. We examine a variety of compensation measures, whereas 
                                                 
7
 There are two potential differences between say-on-pay votes and votes for equity pay plans. The first potential 
difference is that say-on-pay votes allow shareholders to express their approval or dissatisfaction with the broad 
philosophy of executive compensation proposed by the board. In contrast, votes on equity pay plans may be 
narrowly construed as pertaining merely to the proposal at hand. The second potential difference derives from the 
non-binding nature of say-on-pay votes. Since shareholders can freely express their opinions without the possibility 
of direct adverse consequences (e.g., causing an undesirable equity pay plan to pass, or a desirable plan to fail), they 
can vote without concern for such consequences. In other words, say-on-pay votes may be less affected by strategic 
voting because of their advisory rather than binding nature. 
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prior studies typically focus on one such outcome. Our focus on executive compensation also 
enables us to more clearly identify plausible consequences of shareholder voting. Finally, our 
focus on binding rather than advisory votes, such as those on shareholder proposals or say on 
pay, provides a setting in which shareholder voting should be more effective. 
II. Research Design 
A. Determinants of shareholder voting support for equity pay plans and directors 
We first examine the determinants of shareholder voting support for equity pay plans and 
director elections. Given the recent emphasis on measures of dilution by ISS and major 
institutional investors, we also include two measures of the dilution associated with the proposed 
equity pay plan and the firm’s historical equity compensation: Shares Requested, which equals 
the number of shares requested in the equity proposal divided by the number of shares 
outstanding as disclosed in the proxy statement; and Shares Available, which equals the number 
of shares and options available under existing plans as disclosed in the proxy divided by the 
number of shares outstanding. The sum of these measures may be viewed as a proxy for ISS’s 
measure of dilution from an equity compensation plan which they refer to as shareholder value 
transfer (SVT).
8
  
We also include the determinants of CEO incentive-compensation identified by prior 
                                                 
8
 In their 2012 U.S. Proxy Voting Summary Guidelines (accessed on February 21, 2012 at 
http://www.issgovernance.com/files/2012USSummaryGuidelines1312012.pdf), ISS provides the following 
description of SVT: “SVT is expressed as both a dollar amount and as a percentage of market value, and includes 
the new shares proposed, shares available under existing plans, and shares granted but unexercised. The Shareholder 
Value Transfer is reasonable if it falls below the company-specific allowable cap. The allowable cap is determined 
as follows: The top quartile performers in each industry group (using the Global Industry Classification Standard: 
GICS) are identified. Benchmark SVT levels for each industry are established based on these top performers’ 
historic SVT. Regression analyses are run on each industry group to identify the variables most strongly correlated 
to SVT. The benchmark industry SVT level is then adjusted upwards or downwards for the specific company by 
plugging the company-specific performance measures, size and cash compensation into the industry cap equations to 
arrive at the company’s allowable cap.” 
  
- 10 - 
research (e.g., Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Core, Guay, and Larcker, 2008), including 
the CEO’s tenure, log(CEO Tenuret-1); firm size measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s 
annual revenue, log(Revenuet-1); the Book-to-markett-1 ratio to capture firms’ growth 
opportunities; and the previous two years’ accounting and stock returns, ROA and Stock Return, 
respectively.
9
 We also include the CEO’s Comp Mixt-1, defined as one minus the ratio of salary 
to total annual compensation and log(Total Compt-1), defined as the natural logarithm of the 
CEO’s total annual compensation during the last fiscal year ending prior to the meeting, as 
disclosed in the proxy filing for the meeting. These two variables measure the composition (or 
mix) and level, respectively, of CEOs’ annual compensation. Because we include the 
determinants of “expected compensation” and its composition in the specification, the 
coefficients on log(Total Compt−1) and Comp Mixt-1 can be interpreted as the marginal effects of 
“excess compensation” (i.e., the level of compensation that is not explained by the determinants) 
and a relatively high proportion of equity-based pay, respectively, on shareholder voting support. 
To the extent shareholder voting support reflects their dissatisfaction with relatively high levels 
of CEO compensation or relatively high proportions of equity-based pay, we should observe a 
negative relation between these variables and shareholder support. 
As discussed above, prior research regards shareholder support for directors and 
management-sponsored equity compensation proposals as a measure of shareholder approval of 
firms’ compensation practices. Although several papers have focused on director elections (e.g., 
Cai et al., 2009; Fischer et al., 2009), we expect that the relations between the proxies for firms’ 
compensation practices and shareholder support for equity compensation proposals will be 
stronger than the relations between these proxies and shareholder support for directors up for 
                                                 
9
 Our specification is broadly consistent with that of Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2009), who regress director election 
votes on prior-year industry-adjusted EBITDA and excess stock return. 
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election. Finally, to allow for the possibility that proxies for firms’ compensation practices affect 
shareholder support for equity pay proposals only through their effect on shareholder support for 
directors, and vice versa, we also estimate specifications that control for the other measure of 
shareholder support. 
B. Future compensation: Cross-sectional regression analysis 
Our first set of analyses is based on a research design that is similar to that used in most 
of the prior research. In particular, we model a variety of incentive-compensation variables as a 
function of shareholder support for equity pay plans. However, unlike prior research (e.g., 
Fischer et al., 2009), we use the raw values of the incentive-compensation variables as our 
dependent variables and we include a variety of independent variables to control for both the 
determinants of the shareholder vote and the expected incentive-compensation variables.
10
 We 
also include the lagged value of the respective dependent variable in the year prior to the vote 
(e.g., when modeling the effect of shareholder votes on future total CEO compensation, we 
include total CEO compensation for the year ending prior to the year of the vote). Inclusion of 
the lagged value of the dependent variable means that the coefficient on shareholder support 
captures primarily time-series (i.e., within-firm), rather than cross-sectional, variation in the 
dependent variable (e.g., future CEO compensation). This research design choice more closely 
aligns with the notion of shareholder votes affecting changes in firms’ policies, which predicts 
time-series, rather than cross-sectional variation in the level of future CEO compensation.  
Finally, since executive compensation contracting is complex and often involves both 
explicit and implicit contracts over multiple periods, it is unclear when to expect the effect of a 
shareholder vote to manifest in compensation. Therefore, we model the incentive-compensation 
                                                 
10
 As should be expected given our inclusion of standard determinants of compensation in our regressions, we get 
similar inferences throughout if we use excess compensation as the dependent variable. 
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variables over three different horizons: the fiscal year that includes the shareholder meeting at 
which the vote occurs (labeled year t) and each of the two successive fiscal years (labeled years t 
+ 1 and t + 2, respectively). 
C. Future compensation: Instrumental variable analysis 
One concern with our panel regressions (and similar research designs used in prior 
studies) is that one cannot draw causal inferences about effect of shareholder voting on firms’ 
compensation policies because of the endogenous nature of shareholder voting with respect to 
firms’ compensation policies. In particular, it is easy to conceive of ways in which the error term 
in regressions of future compensation could be correlated with the main regressor of interest, 
shareholder support. For example, if shareholders’ information set includes insight into future 
compensation levels that is unexplained by included controls and if shareholders provide lower 
voting support when they anticipate higher levels of future compensation, then the estimated 
coefficient on shareholder support will be biased downward (i.e., lower shareholder support will 
be associated with higher future compensation levels). We attempt to alleviate concerns about 
this form of endogeneity using instrumental variables estimation. 
We instrument for shareholder support with ISS For Pay Plan, an indicator for whether 
the compensation proposal put forth received a favorable recommendation from ISS. The 
decision model of ISS, as extensively documented in ISS policy documents, is largely based on 
historical compensation data, all of which are obtained exclusively from proxy filings issued 
prior to the relevant meeting. In the terminology of Pearl (2000) and Morgan and Winship 
(2007), ISS For Pay Plan may eliminate the confounding effect of the “back-door path” running 
from shareholders’ information about future compensation that is not reflected in the current 
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proxy filings to shareholder voting.
11
 The exclusion restriction implied by our use of ISS For Pay 
Plan as an instrument for shareholder support is that firms do not respond directly to ISS 
recommendations by altering future compensation packages, but only indirectly, with 
shareholder support mediating the effect of ISS recommendations.
12
 As we discuss in more detail 
below, we assess the sensitivity of our instrumental variables estimates to relaxing the traditional 
assumption that the exclusion restriction is exactly satisfied. 
D. Future compensation: Regression discontinuity design 
We also supplement our instrumental variables analysis with an alternative, and arguably 
superior, research design for identifying the causal effects of shareholder support for equity pay 
plans on firms’ compensation policies. Rather than considering the level of shareholder voting 
support for an equity compensation plan as the treatment of interest, we instead consider failing 
to receive sufficient shareholder support as the treatment of interest for this analysis. Although 
failing a shareholder vote is a more narrow treatment in the sense that it relates to only a subset 
of equity pay plans, it provides a more powerful setting in which to identify the causal effects of 
shareholder voting support. In particular, as discussed by Lee (2008), regression discontinuity 
designs (RDDs) “involve a dichotomous treatment variable that is a deterministic function of a 
single, observed, continuous covariate.” In the context of shareholder voting on equity 
compensation plans, whether the plan fails (the “treatment variable”) is a deterministic function 
of the percentage of votes for the plan (i.e., if the percentage is below the cutoff, typically 50%, 
                                                 
11
 If we could develop a proxy for shareholders’ information about future compensation beyond what is captured by 
the control variables that we include in our specification, then including such a proxy would eliminate the “back-
door path” between shareholders’ information and future incentive-compensation outcomes that would bias the 
estimated effect of shareholder voting. However, absent such a proxy, there is a correlated omitted variables 
problem and credible identification of a causal effect of shareholder voting requires a valid instrument that only 
affects future incentive-compensation indirectly through its effect on shareholder voting, and not through this 
possible “back-door path.”  
12
 Absent an effect on shareholder support, there appears to be no reason for firms to be concerned about ISS 
recommendations to institutional shareholders on how to vote shares. 
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then the plan fails). 
RDD has been used in voting settings in prior literature. For example, Lee (2008) 
examines the incumbency effect that results from winning elections in the US House of 
Representatives, a treatment assigned by receiving more than 50% of the vote. RDD has also 
been applied in the context of shareholder elections. Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012) use 
RDD to examine the effect of governance changes related to shareholder proposals. Two issues 
with their setting are the heterogeneity of proposals (see Appendix A of Cuñat et al., 2012) and 
the differing motives of the shareholders making the proposals. Nonetheless, Cuñat et al. (2012) 
find evidence of a positive stock price reaction to the passage of a proposal, with stronger results 
when the analysis focuses on proposals related to shareholder rights of the kind examined by 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). Listokin (2009) uses RDD to examine the effect of 
dissidents’ success in proxy fights on stock returns. One issue with this setting is that proxy 
fights are relatively rare events and Listokin’s sample includes only 97 observations. 
Although RDD is a powerful research design for identifying causal effects, one potential 
concern that can impair its validity is what is termed “manipulation of the running variable,” 
which in our setting corresponds to firms “managing” shareholder voting to achieve 50% 
support. In particular, Listokin (2008) provides evidence of management’s ability to sway close 
votes in its favor. Using a sample of 13,360 unique votes on management-sponsored proposals 
from 1997 through 2004 collected by Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), Listokin 
(2008) finds 22 votes that receive between 47 and 50 percent support and 167 votes that receive 
between 50 and 53 percent support. We find a similar result for our sample (Panel A of Figure 
1), which raises the possibility that non-random factors drive the assignment of firms around the 
50% threshold. As we discuss in more detail below, management’s ability to influence voting 
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outcomes does not necessarily invalidate either our RDD analysis or the resulting estimates, as 
long as firms are unable to precisely manipulate voting results. Moreover, the fact that some 
equity pay proposals fail to receive sufficient shareholder support to pass the threshold suggests 
that although management may be able to exert some control over the outcome, they cannot 
precisely control the outcome. 
III. Sample, Data, and Descriptive Statistics 
A. Sample selection 
We compile data on votes on stock-based compensation plans from two primary sources. 
The first source, Equilar Inc., provides data about the nature of plans proposed (e.g., stock 
option, restricted stock, or omnibus), whether the proposal relates to a new or an existing plan, 
the number of shares requested, and details on the votes for, votes against, and abstentions.
13
 
Equilar provides data on 5,791 equity compensation plan proposals (excluding 968 stock 
purchase plans) submitted to shareholder vote between 2003 and 2010.  
The second source, ISS Voting Analytics, provides information about matters voted on at 
shareholder meetings for 4,759 distinct companies over the period from 2001 to 2010, including 
details on the votes for, votes against, and abstentions for each proposal, the voting standard 
(typically ≥ 50%), the voting base (i.e., shares voting on the proposal, shares voting or 
abstaining, or shares outstanding), whether the proposal passed or failed, and ISS’s 
recommendation for shareholder voting.    
We focus on votes on management-sponsored equity compensation proposals, for which 
ISS Voting Analytics provides 9,952 observations. Additional data requirements reduce our ISS 
                                                 
13
 Equilar is a provider of comprehensive executive compensation data, much of which is obtained from SEC filings. 
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Voting Analytics sample to 9,735 observations and our Equilar sample to 5,767.
14
 The 
intersection of these two data sets yields our initial primary sample, which consists of 3,439 
observations. For our RDD analyses, we require a precise measure of % For Pay Plan, which 
requires correct specification of the voting base, a data item that is provided by ISS Voting 
Analytics, but not Equilar. 
To maximize the power of our RDD analyses, which rely primarily on observations with 
voting outcomes close to the 50% threshold, we identify 180 observations from Equilar for 
which we lack data from ISS Voting Analytics, and that have voting support greater than 40% 
(using votes for and votes against as the voting base), but less than 60% (using votes for, votes 
against, and abstentions in the voting base). We hand-collect data from 203 proxy filings for 
these 180 observations. We define a “close vote” as one with voting support measured with the 
correct voting base, between 45% and 55%. This hand-collection adds 131 observations (68 
close votes) to the 9,499 (327 close votes) for which we have the necessary data from ISS Voting 
Analytics. Our total sample of close votes is 378, and our total sample of votes is 9,420. 
B. Measurement of compensation variables 
We examine a comprehensive set of CEO and company-wide incentive-compensation 
variables derived from compensation data from Equilar. The first four variables are related to the 
CEO’s annual compensation and are (1) Cash Comp, defined as the natural logarithm of the sum 
of the CEO’s annual salary and bonus payments, (2) Option Comp, defined as the natural 
logarithm of an adjusted Black-Scholes value for the CEO’s annual option grants, (3) Total 
Comp, defined as the natural logarithm of the value of the CEO’s total annual compensation (i.e., 
salary, bonus, restricted stock and option grants, and long-term incentive plan payouts), and (4) 
                                                 
14
 We lose 220 observations because ISS Voting Analytics does not include the data required to calculate % For Pay 
Plan. 
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Comp Mix, defined as one minus the ratio of salary to total annual compensation.
15
 
We also examine Portfolio Delta, which measures the sensitivity of the CEO’s equity 
portfolio value to changes in stock price. Core and Guay (1999) provide evidence that boards use 
restricted stock and option grants to adjust CEOs’ equity portfolio delta to the desired “optimal” 
level. Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Core and Guay, 1999; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 
2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006), we measure Portfolio Delta as the natural logarithm of the 
change in the risk-neutral (Black-Scholes) value of the CEO’s equity portfolio for a 1% change 
in the firm’s stock price. 
We also examine CEO Turnover, an indicator for whether the CEO at the date of the 
shareholder meeting is no longer the CEO on the respective measurement date, since hiring and 
firing the CEO is one of the primary roles of the board, and termination can be a powerful 
incentive mechanism. Prior research (e.g., Engel, Hayes, and Wang, 2003) has documented a 
number of performance measures that are used by boards when making turnover decisions and it 
is reasonable to assume that shareholder support for equity pay plans may also be considered by 
directors when making their turnover decisions. Finally, since the effect of shareholder voting 
may not be confined solely to CEOs’ incentive-compensation, we examine Options Granted, 
defined as the aggregate number of options granted to the firm’s employees during the fiscal year 
scaled by the total number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the year. For example, if 
shareholder support reflects their opposition to the dilutive effects of a proposed equity pay plan, 
                                                 
15
 We calculate the risk-neutral value of a CEO’s option grants and holdings using the Black-Scholes formula with 
the following parameters. Annualized volatility is calculated using continuously compounded monthly returns over 
the prior 36 months, requiring a minimum of 12 months. The risk-free rate is calculated using interpolated interest 
rate on a Treasury Note with the same maturity as the remaining life of the option multiplied by 0.7 to account for 
the prevalence of early exercise. Dividend yield is calculated as the dividends paid during the previous 12 months 
scaled by stock price at the beginning of the month. This is essentially the same method described by Core and Guay 
(2002). 
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boards may respond to this concern by curtailing future firm-wide option grants rather than (or, 
perhaps, in addition to) future option grants to the CEO. 
C. Timing of incentive-compensation variable measurement 
Our tests require a choice of when compensation can be considered a future outcome 
relative to the meeting at which a shareholder vote occurred. Clearly compensation reported for 
the fiscal year ending prior to the proxy filing, which we label as year t–1, is not a future 
outcome relative to the meeting following the proxy filing. However, it is also unclear whether 
compensation for the fiscal year that includes the meeting date, which we label year t, is a future 
outcome. Fischer et al. (2009) focus on compensation for the first year beginning after the 
meeting date, which we label year t+1, due to concerns that compensation variables measured in 
year t may not capture the board’s response to shareholder votes in year t. However, it seems that 
for several compensation components (bonus is perhaps the clearest case), directors would have 
some latitude to make adjustments in the year of the vote in response to shareholder support from 
the votes at the meeting. Furthermore, to the extent that directors are concerned about their 
reputational capital, if they do not adjust compensation for year t, then shareholders will not 
observe the changes in compensation until the proxy for year t+2 is filed.
16
 However, some 
elements of compensation (salary is an obvious example) may be set by the time of the proxy 
filing and shareholder meeting, and thus should not be affected by the voting outcomes at the 
annual meeting. To accommodate ambiguity in the timing of the effects of shareholder voting on 
compensation, we examine incentive-compensation variables in both years t and t+1. 
Additionally, to allow for the possibility that there is some lag in the effect of shareholder votes, 
                                                 
16
 This assumes that the proxy filing is the primary channel for firms to communicate information about executive 
compensation. We are not aware of any empirical evidence on firms’ use of alternative channels to communicate 
information about executive compensation. 
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we also examine compensation in year t+2 relative to the meeting date. 
D. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table I presents the median values of the primary variables in our analysis 
according to the outcome of the vote on the equity pay plan. A visual comparison of the second 
and third columns (i.e., All Passing Votes and All Failing Votes, respectively) suggests that these 
firm-years differ along many dimensions, including their incentive compensation policies prior 
to the shareholder vote. A comparison of the last two columns (i.e., Close Passes and Close 
Fails, respectively) suggests that these two sets of firm-years are more similar along most 
dimensions, which is important for the validity of our subsequent RDD analysis. 
Panel B of Table I reports the frequency of the different voting outcomes during each of 
our sample years. Although both failing votes and votes that closely fail (i.e., those that receive 
between 45% and 50% of the shareholder vote) are relatively rare, they are not confined to any 
particular subperiod of our ten-year sample period. 
Panel C of Table I provides details on the sample derived from 24,784 firm-years 
provided by ISS Voting Analytics for matters put to shareholder votes in the years between 2001 
and 2010 for 4,821 distinct firms. Of the 24,784 firm-years, 8,821 (35.6%) include a vote on an 
equity compensation plan, which implies that a typical firm seeks shareholder approval of an 
equity compensation proposal approximately once every three years. However, there is wide 
variation in the frequency with which firms put forward equity compensation proposals. For the 
4,759 firms in our sample, more than 70% put two or fewer equity compensation proposals to a 
vote during 2001–2010, but 152 firms have six or more plans considered. There are also three 
firms, CEC Entertainment, Electronic Arts, and Plantronics, Inc., that put forward an equity 
compensation plan each year during 2001–2010. 
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IV. Results 
A. Determinants of shareholder support 
Table II reports the results of our analysis of shareholder support for both equity 
compensation plans and directors in years in which equity compensation plans are put to a 
shareholder vote. The first two columns examine the relations between % For Directors, the 
number of votes for a director divided by the sum of votes for that director and the votes 
withheld, and variables that capture firms’ compensation practices and predictors of expected 
compensation. Regardless of whether shareholder support for equity compensation plans 
considered at the same meeting (i.e., % For Pay Plan) is included in the analysis, we find little 
evidence that shareholders use votes on directors to express dissatisfaction with more dilutive 
equity pay plan proposals or higher CEO compensation. If anything, there is a positive, albeit 
weak, relationship between the dilution associated with the proposed equity pay plan and total 
CEO compensation and shareholder support for directors (coefficient on Shares Requested of 
0.048, t-stat. of 1.866).  
The last two columns of Table II present results for % For Pay Plan, the number of votes 
for the equity compensation proposal divided by the voting base, which varies by firm, but 
generally equals either the sum of votes for and votes against the proposal, or the sum of votes 
for, votes against, and abstentions. Inferences from both columns are identical, but we focus on 
the last column for brevity. In both columns, there is a clear negative relationship between 
shareholder support for the equity pay plan and the two measures of shareholder dilution, Shares 
Requested (coefficient of –0.561 and t-stat of –15.450) and Shares Available (coefficient of –
0.367 and t-stat of –5.078), as well as Comp Mixt-1 (coefficient of –0.002 and t-stat of –6.623), 
which captures the proportion of annual CEO pay that is non-salary, and Log(Total Compt-1) 
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(coefficient of –0.006 and t-stat of –2.158), which, because of the other control variables, 
captures “excess” compensation. These results suggest that rather than “shareholders 
express[ing] their dissatisfaction [with executive compensation] by withholding votes for 
directors” (Cai, et al., 2009), a more important and direct channel though which shareholders 
express such dissatisfaction is their votes on equity compensation proposals.
17
 
B. Shareholder support for equity compensation plans and future compensation 
Prior research has argued that directors respond to lower levels of shareholder support by 
reducing future CEO compensation. For example, Fischer et al. (2009) examine the association 
between shareholder support in director elections, including elections in which the CEO is a 
director, and future excess compensation. They find weak evidence of a relation between some 
of their measures of shareholder support in director elections and future CEO compensation, but 
a stronger relation when they focus on elections involving the CEO. Similarly, Cai et al. (2009) 
examine the relation between shareholder support in director elections and future changes in 
excess compensation, but limit their analysis to the subsample of CEOs with positive “excess” 
compensation prior to the vote. They find significant relations when the director is a member of 
the compensation committee, but not for other members of the board or for all board members 
taken together. The lack of a result for all directors in both Cai et al. (2009) and Fischer et al. 
(2009) is consistent with our results in Table II, which suggest that shareholders’ votes for 
directors is unlikely to be the most powerful or direct channel through which shareholders 
express their support for firms’ compensation policies. For this reason, our primary analyses 
                                                 
17
 Note that our analysis is limited to director elections at meetings where equity compensation proposals are also 
considered. It may be that, absent such proposals, shareholders express their dissatisfaction through their votes in 
director elections.  
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focus on shareholder votes on equity-based compensation plans.
18
  
Table III reports the results of panel regressions of various compensation-related 
outcomes on shareholder voting support for equity pay plans (% For Pay Plan) and directors (% 
For Director). Panel A models contemporaneously measured (i.e., year t) incentive-
compensation variables and the results reveal that there is a strong negative relation between 
shareholder support for the pay plan in four of the seven specifications: Option Compt 
(coefficient of –2.523 and t-stat of –4.279); Total Compt (coefficient of –0.260 and t-stat of –
1.651); Comp Mixt (coefficient of –0.169 and t-stat of –3.066); and Options Grantedt (coefficient 
of –0.013 and t-stat of –7.640). The exceptions are Cash Compt and Portfolio Deltat, for which 
the relations are negative, but insignificant. In addition, director support is insignificant in every 
specification except Option Compt, in which it is negative and marginally significant (coefficient 
of –1.511 and t-stat of –1.829). Because the outcome variables in Panel A are measured during 
the fiscal year that includes the meeting date, these results are consistent with shareholders 
observing relatively high levels of CEO incentive compensation, or high levels of aggregate 
options grants, and responding with lower support for the equity pay plan.
19
 
Panels B and C of Table III model the one- and two-year-ahead incentive-compensation 
variables, respectively. Similar to the results in Panel A, we find that shareholder support for the 
equity pay plan exhibits significant relations only with Option Compt+1 (coefficient of –1.213 and 
t-stat of –2.057) and Comp Mixt+1 (coefficient of –0.151 and t-stat of –4.592). However, unlike 
the specifications in Panel A, the dependent variables in Panels B and C are unambiguously 
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 Nonetheless, given the focus of prior research on director elections, we also examine shareholder support in 
director elections (both those that occur at shareholder meetings at which there is vote on an equity compensation 
plan and those at which there is not) in Table VII. We find virtually no evidence to support the hypothesized positive 
relation between future compensation and shareholder votes for directors. 
19
 Recall that because these specifications include both the lagged value of the dependent variable and additional 
determinants as control variables, they can be viewed as models of changes in annual “excess” incentive-
compensation and “excess” aggregate option grants. 
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measured after the shareholder meeting at which the vote occurs. Therefore, if directors respond 
to less favorable shareholder sentiment as expressed in their votes on equity compensation plans 
by reducing future compensation, then the effect should manifest in positive coefficients on % 
For Pay Plan in the regressions presented in Panels B and C of Table III. The absence of 
positive coefficients across the various specifications in these panels is inconsistent with findings 
of prior literature (e.g., Cai et al., 2009; Fischer et al., 2009, which find modest evidence of a 
positive relation between shareholder support and future CEO compensation) and is at odds with 
the notion that directors respond to shareholder voting support for pay plans and directors. 
C. Instrumental variable analysis 
As discussed above, one explanation for negative or insignificant coefficients is the 
potential endogeneity if shareholder support reflects shareholders’ expectations about future 
compensation that is not captured by the variables included in the regression analyses in Table 
III. To address this possibility, we estimate instrumental variable regressions of various one-
year-ahead (i.e., year t+1) incentive-compensation variables on shareholder voting support for 
equity compensation plans (% For Pay Plan) using ISS’s voting recommendation (ISS For Pay 
Plan) as the instrument for shareholder support. To the extent that ISS formulates its voting 
recommendations for equity pay plans as a mechanical (and therefore, somewhat arbitrary) 
function of historical financial and compensation variables, it will produce variation in 
shareholder support for equity pay plans that is exogenous with respect to future incentive-
compensation.  
The estimates from our instrumental variables specification in Table IV provide little 
evidence that shareholder support for equity pay plans is associated with future incentive 
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compensation.
20
 Whereas the coefficient on % For Pay Plan with Option Compt+1 as the 
dependent variable is negative in Panel B of Table III, it is positive and statistically insignificant 
in Table IV (coefficient of 0.585 and t-stat of 0.457). The two specifications in which % For Pay 
Plan is statistically significant are those with Portfolio Deltat+1 and Comp Mixt+1 as dependent 
variables (coefficients of –0.241 and –0.115, respectively, and t-stats of –4.443 and –2.512, 
respectively). However, the sign of both coefficients is inconsistent with the prediction that 
directors respond to lower support for equity pay plans by reducing equity incentives and equity-
based pay.
21
  
D. Regression discontinuity design (RDD) analyses 
Tables V and VI report the results of our RDD analyses. Panels A and B of Table V 
consider one- and two-year-ahead (i.e., years t+1 and t+2) compensation-related variables, 
respectively. Table VII considers outcomes related to subsequent actions that firms may take in 
response to failing to receive sufficient shareholder support for an equity pay plan, such as 
whether the firm makes an additional request for shares, the number of shares requested by a 
subsequent proposal, and the number of shares approved by shareholders in a subsequent 
proposal, in each case in year t+1. 
The analysis in Table V follows Lee and Lemieux (2010) and uses “excess” versions of 
the incentive-compensation variables, which are defined as the residuals from the respective 
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 The first-stage model is similar to the specification of shareholder support for equity pay plans presented in Table 
II, except that we also include ISS For Pay Plan as an additional explanatory variable. Because the resulting 
estimates are similar to those reported in Table II, we do not tabulate the first-stage estimates, but note that ISS For 
Pay Plan has a strong positive relationship with % For Pay Plan, which suggests that it is a strong instrument (the 
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) F-statistic is at least 647 in each specification). We address the validity of ISS 
recommendations as an instrumental variable in more detail below when we discuss the results of our IV analysis of 
shareholder support in director elections, where we find modest evidence of a positive relation between shareholder 
support and future CEO incentive compensation in some specifications. 
21
 In untabulated analyzes, we find that there are no statistically significant associations between shareholder support 
and two-year ahead compensation outcomes in this instrumental variables specification. 
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regressions in Table III.
22
 Finally, because there is no generally accepted method for choosing 
the appropriate bandwidth over which to estimate the local linear regression (Lee and Lemieux, 
2010), we report the results using a bandwidth of 0.02 (which we label 100) and both a shorter 
and wider bandwidth (i.e., 0.01 and 0.04, which are labeled 50 and 200, respectively). Although 
certain compensation-related variables are significant in some specifications (e.g., Excess 
log(Portfolio Deltat+2) in Panel B), the collective evidence from Table V does not indicate a 
causal effect of failure to receive sufficient shareholder support for an equity pay plan on future 
CEO incentive-compensation.  
The lack of an effect can also be seen in Figure 2, which plots the fitted values of local 
polynomial regressions on either side of the 50% discontinuity in the percentage of votes in favor 
of the pay plan (% For Pay Plan) for the six one-year-ahead incentive-compensation outcomes 
(i.e., the dependent variables in Table V, Panel A). In each case, the regression lines essentially 
meet and show little sign of a discontinuity, which would be visual evidence of a causal effect of 
failing a shareholder vote. These figures corroborate the lack of statistically signficant 
differences in Panel A of Table V. 
Given that the votes on equity pay plans are binding in the sense that a failed vote 
deprives firms of the requested equity for compensation purposes, the absence of an effect of a 
failed shareholder vote on future compensation is surprising. To better understand the actions 
that firms may take to avoid curtailing, or otherwise altering compensation practices in response 
to shareholder rejection of equity pay plans, we examine a number of additional outcomes that 
                                                 
22
 In principle, additional control variables are not needed for identification in RDD. However, similar to other types 
of random experiment, the inclusion of relevant controls reduces sampling variability and the precision of the 
resulting estimate of the treatment effect. In addition, using “excess” measures of the various dependent variables 
allows for a more accurate visual representation of any effect of shareholder voting on equity pay plans in Figure 2. 
See Lee and Lemieux (2010) for further discussion of this issue. 
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reflect actions that firms may take in response to a failed shareholder vote.
23
 Results from this 
analysis are presented in Table VI. The first variable, Proposalt+1, is an indicator that equals one 
if the firm seeks additional shares in the year following a proposal. It is plausible that failing to 
garner sufficient shareholder support for an equity pay plan forces a firm to seek shares in a 
proposal in the following year. Consistent with this prediction, the estimated effect of 
shareholder rejection of a plan is a 0.42 increase in the probability of seeking shares in the 
following year (we focus on the Bandwidth 200 results throughout, though results provided in 
Table VI are similar for narrower bandwidths). This effect is clearly economically consequential 
and statistically significant (t-stat of –4.44). We also examine the number of shares requested in 
the following year, with missing values coded as zero (i.e., we treat years in which no shares are 
sought as requesting zero shares). Consistent with our earlier results, the estimated effect is 
negative and significant (coefficient of –0.020 and t-stat of –3.124). Finally, we examine a 
Shares Approvedt+1, which measures the number of shares approved by shareholders in years t 
and t+1. However, we find little evidence of a difference in the number of shares approved 
between firms whose plans were rejected and firms whose plans were approved by shareholders 
(coefficient of –0.015 and t-stat of 1.266). The results in Table VI suggest that the primary 
consequence of failing to obtain shareholder approval for an equity pay plan is that firms are 
more likely seek additional shares in the subsequent year and that shareholder generally approve 
these subsequent requests, which together result in little apparent difference between the 
compensation practices of firms where shareholders vote down a proposed equity pay plan and 
their counterparts where shareholders approve the plan. 
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 In addition, we examine shareholder support and find little evidence of any difference in shareholder support for 
plans put to a shareholder vote in year t+1. That said, this analysis is clearly problematic, as we do not observe 
shareholder support in years in which firms do not propose an equity pay plan. 
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To properly interpret our RDD results, it is crucial to appreciate the causal effect that is 
being estimated. As discussed in Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001, p.207), one limitation 
of the RDD approach “is that it only identifies treatment effects locally at the point at which the 
probability of receiving treatment changes discontinuously.” In our setting, the treatment effects 
we identify weights observations according to their probability of being a close vote. As such, 
our RDD analysis clearly does not speak to the effect of losing a vote that shareholders would 
otherwise overwhelmingly support. We do not, however, view this as a major limitation of our 
analysis. As discussed in Lee (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010), it is not always clear that the 
counterfactuals are well defined for observations far from the discontinuity (i.e., the 50% 
shareholder approval threshold). In other words, it is unclear what it means for shareholder 
support to be shifted from, say, 85% (which, according to Panel A of Table I, is roughly the 
average level of shareholder support for the equity pay plans in our sample) to below 50%. 
Moreover, as noted by Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001, p.207), “in some cases [the] 
localized parameter is precisely the parameter of interest.” In our setting, it is reasonable to view 
the effect of losing a vote that is weighted according to the probability of losing as the most 
relevant, since plans with overwhelming shareholder support seem to be of less interest from a 
policy perspective. 
As discussed above (and illustrated in Panel A of Figure 1), there is a clear discontinuity 
in the distribution of voting outcomes around the 50% threshold. Listokin (2008) finds similar 
evidence across a variety of management-sponsored proposals submitted for shareholder vote. 
Although Listokin (2008, 162) suggests that “the mechanism whereby management obtains 
accurate information and seeks to influence the vote is unclear,” Listokin (2008, 162) speculates 
that “management may apply intense campaigning effort to sway votes and/or adjust poll-closing 
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times in order to gain victory.” McCrary (2008) shows that estimated treatment effects may be 
biased when there is manipulation of the “running variable” (i.e., the continuous variable that 
assigns subjects to the treatment or control groups, which is % For Pay Plan in our research 
setting). The bias stems, in part, from the likely relation between the unobserved treatment effect 
and the level of manipulation. In our setting, it is possible that managers of firms that anticipate 
greater negative consequences of shareholder rejection of their equity compensation proposals 
are the ones who will exert additional efforts to cross the 50% threshold in the case of a close 
vote. However, as discussed by Lee and Lemieux (2010), manipulation of the treatment variable 
does not invalidate RDD as long as subjects are “unable to precisely manipulate the assignment 
variable” (emphasis original). The fact that some of our sample firms just fail the vote suggests 
that management cannot exercise precise control over the voting outcome. Nevertheless, if there 
is a differential in the degree to which management can exercise control of the vote, our estimate 
of the treatment effect will be downwardly biased, and our failure to find an effect may be 
attributable to managements’ differential ability to manipulate the vote. 
Notwithstanding the possible bias in our estimated potential effect of shareholder 
rejection of equity compensation plans, we do not find evidence of an actual effect of such 
rejection. Our results are instead consistent with two types of firms that comprise our sample. 
The first type faces no material effect in terms of future compensation from shareholder rejection 
of their equity compensation plan and so has less incentive to manipulate the vote. The second 
type faces a potential effect on future compensation, but management is able to push the vote 
across the threshold and avoid such effects. Even if correct, this explanation for the absence of 
significant estimated effects provides little assurance regarding the efficacy of the requirement to 
submit equity compensation plans to shareholder vote because it suggests that management can 
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manipulate votes that are in danger of failing. 
E. Shareholder support in director elections and future compensation 
Given that our findings are generally inconsistent with those of prior studies that examine 
the relation between shareholder support for directors and future compensation (e.g., Cai et al., 
2009; Fischer et al., 2009), we repeat our cross-sectional and instrumental variables analyses on 
a larger sample of director elections than was examined in prior studies.
24
 To construct our 
sample of director elections, we select all director elections on ISS Voting Analytics for which a 
director name is provided. This yields 120,554 votes related to 50,912 directors at 4,663 firms. 
We then match these observations with data on directors’ committee memberships from Equilar 
using firm identifiers such as CUSIPs and a “fuzzy match” on director names within each firm-
year. This yields data on 104,684 director elections from 2003 through 2010. Combining these 
with data on CEO compensation (described above) reduces our sample to 102,534 observations 
from 4,043 distinct firms (18,598 firm-years). 
Panel A of Table VII presents estimates from cross-sectional regressions of one-year-
ahead incentive-compensation variables for our sample of director elections regardless of 
whether there is a vote on an equity pay plan at the annual meeting. We find little evidence that 
future CEO compensation is affected by the level shareholder support for directors. However, in 
the second-to-last column we find that the total number of options granted to all of the firm’s 
employees in the year following the director election (Options Grantedt+1) is significantly 
negatively related to shareholder support for directors (coefficient –0.004, t-stat –4.35), which 
stands in contrast to the conventional prediction of a positive coefficient. However, somewhat 
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 Note that because it is extremely rare for directors to fail to receive less than 50% of shareholder support (as 
illustrated in Panel B of Figure 1). Thus, it is not feasible to conduct a RDD analysis with respect to this type of 
vote. 
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consistent with prior research, we find that future CEO turnover is less likely when there is 
greater support for directors (coefficient on % For Director for CEO Turnovert+1 of –0.015, t-stat 
–3.25). 
Following prior research, we also conducted analyses similar to those in Table VII, but 
with subsamples restricted to (i) elections of only those directors who chair the firm’s 
compensation committee, and (ii) all directors on the firm’s compensation committee. This 
analysis is motivated by the idea that these directors may be more responsive to shareholder 
votes than other directors regarding executive compensation decisions. In each case 
(untabulated), we find no statistically significant association between any of the dependent 
variables and % For Directors, with the exception of Options Grantedt+1, which had a 
statistically significant negative coefficient in both subsamples. 
Similar to our analysis of votes on equity pay plans, we also estimate instrumental 
variable regressions of various one-year-ahead (i.e., year t+1) incentive-compensation variables 
on shareholder voting support for a director up for election (% For Director) using ISS’s voting 
recommendation (ISS For Director) as the instrument for shareholder support. Results from this 
analysis are presented in Panel B of Table VII. In contrast to the OLS results in Panel A, we find 
a positive relation between shareholder support for directors and the value of future stock grants 
to CEOs (coefficient on % For Director for Option Compt+1 of 2.32, t-stat. of 2.19) and total 
future CEO compensation (coefficient on % For Director for Total Compt+1 of 0.24, t-stat. of 
2.59). Consistent with the effect on future stock grants, we also find evidence of positive 
relations between shareholder support for directors and CEOs’ equity portfolio delta (coefficient 
on % For Director for Portfolio Deltat+1 of 0.35, t-stat. of 1.74), and compensation mix 
(coefficient on % For Director for Comp Mixt+1 of 0.096, t-stat. of 2.85). Moreover, the negative 
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associations between shareholder support for directors and future aggregate option grants and 
future CEO turnover observed in Panel A are not evident in the III analysis in Panel B. 
Although the IV results in Panel B of Table VII are consistent with prior studies, it is 
possible that our instrument is not perfectly exogenous with respect to future incentive-
compensation outcomes. Because of this concern, we examine the sensitivity of our IV analysis 
to relaxing the assumption that ISS For Director is not strictly exogenous. In particular, we 
follow the partial identification approach outlined by Ashley (2009) to examine the sensitivity of 
the estimated coefficients to a positive relationship between the unobserved error and ISS For 
Director, which reflects the concern that firms may directly reduce compensation in response to 
an unfavorable ISS recommendation (rather than only indirectly through the effect of ISS’s 
recommendation on shareholder support). For brevity, we only discuss the sensitivity of the 
results for Option Compt+1 and Total Compt+1. In our sensitivity analysis, we find that an 
assumed correlation between the instrument and the unobserved error term as small as 0.022 
(0.020) is sufficient to cause the estimated coefficient on % For Director to be negative when 
Option Compt+1 (Total Compt+1) is the dependent variable. For comparison, using the approach of 
Ashley (2009), the estimated correlation between % For Director and the unobserved error term 
when ISS For Director is assumed to be perfectly exogenous has a magnitude of 0.041 (0.037). 
These magnitudes indicate that even if ISS For Director is much less correlated with the error 
than % For Director is, the estimated effect on % For Director will be zero or negative, which 
would produce inferences that are inconsistent with those of prior studies.
25
 Therefore, although 
                                                 
25
 Another way of characterizing the highly sensitive relationship between % For Directors and future incentive-
compensation measures in our instrumental variables analysis is that, even though ISS For Director is a strong 
instrument (i.e., it produces substantial variation in % For Director), the strength of the statistical relationship (as 
well as the economic magnitude) between % For Director and the various future incentive-compensation variables 
is modest.   
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our results provide some evidence that shareholder support for director elections has the effect 
predicted in prior research, our sensitivity analysis suggests that these results are highly sensitive 
to even a small correlation between ISS For Director and the error term in the regression.
26
 
The results in Table VII provide little evidence that directors respond to lower 
shareholder support by reducing future CEO compensation or aggregate option grants to the 
firms’ employees. Overall, our findings are inconsistent with inferences from other studies (e.g., 
Cai et al., 2009; Fischer et al., 2009). However, these results are broadly consistent with our 
findings in Table III that consider the subset of director elections when there is also a vote on an 
equity compensation plan. 
V. Conclusion 
This study examines the effects of shareholder support for equity compensation plans on 
the level and composition of future CEO incentive compensation and future aggregate (i.e., firm-
wide) stock option grants. We find virtually no statistical evidence that either lower shareholder 
support for, or the outright rejection of, proposed equity compensation plans leads to decreases in 
future CEO incentive-compensation or firm-wide stock option grants. This null result obtains 
even after applying instrumental variable and regression discontinuity approaches to mitigate 
concerns about the endogenous nature of shareholder voting. The lack of an effect of shareholder 
rejection of equity compensation plans is surprising. As we demonstrate, shareholder support for 
these plans does have the predicted negative relation with the level and composition of “excess” 
executive compensation reported to shareholders in advance of the vote, suggesting that these are 
matters of concern to shareholders when deciding how to vote. Furthermore, the voting outcomes 
                                                 
26
 We reach a similar conclusion in our sensitivity analysis of Portfolio Deltat+1 and Comp Mixt+1, the other two 
variables with statistically significant associations with % For Director. 
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are binding and their natural effects are relatively easy to identify and measure ex post (e.g., it is 
reasonable to expect that a shareholder rejection of a request for additional shares for a stock 
option plan should lead to fewer stock option grants in the future). Collectively, our results raise 
doubts about the efficacy of shareholder voting as a corporate governance mechanism for 
influencing executive compensation, and also call into question the efficacy of recent regulatory 
efforts that have focused on strengthening shareholder voting rights, particularly with regard to 
executive compensation.  
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Figure 1 
Histogram of Voting Percentages  
 
Panel A: Equity Compensation Plans 
 
This figure presents a histogram of the percentage of votes in favor of management-sponsored equity compensation plans (% For 
Pay Plan). 
 
Panel B: Director Elections 
 
This figure presents a histogram of the percentage of votes in favor of directors (% For Directors). 
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Figure 2 
 
Regression Discontinuity Plots of Excess Contemporaneous Compensation Variables 
Excess log(Cash Compt+1) Excess log(Option Grant Valuet+1) Excess log(Total Compt+1) 
   
Excess log(Portfolio Deltat+1) Excess Comp Mixt+1  Excess Options Grantedt+1  
   
These figures present plots of the fitted values of local polynomial regressions on either side of the 50% discontinuity in the 
percentage of votes in favor of the pay plan (% For Pay Plan). The dependent variables are excess one year-ahead (i.e., for the 
fiscal year following the year of the shareholder meeting) compensation variables defined as the residuals from the regressions in 
Table IV, Panel B. The bandwidth is 0.04 (“Bandwidth 200”) and a triangular kernel is used for the estimation.  
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Table I 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: By Vote Outcome 
 
All 
Votes 
All Passing 
Votes 
All Failing 
Votes  
All Close 
Votes 
Close 
Passes 
Close 
Fails 
Difference 
in Medians 
% For Pay Plan 83.3% 83.7% 41.0%  52.1% 52.7% 47.5% 12.302*** 
% For Directors 96.9% 97.0% 92.9%  95.1% 95.3% 92.8% 2.098** 
CEO Tenuret−1 5.00 5.00 6.15  6.45 6.30 7.70 -1.000 
Revenuet−1 564 586 158  253 260 224 1.762* 
Book-to-markett−1 0.429 0.430 0.417  0.412 0.404 0.443 -0.983 
ROAt 0.033 0.033 0.027  0.026 0.026 0.023 0.555 
ROAt−1 0.034 0.034 0.020  0.027 0.023 0.032 -0.697 
ROAt−2 0.036 0.036 0.028  0.030 0.033 0.028 1.320 
Stock Returnt 0.114 0.112 0.183  0.155 0.189 0.111 0.651 
Stock Returnt−1 0.074 0.073 0.098  0.114 0.133 0.054 1.197 
Stock Returnt−2 0.118 0.118 0.106  0.158 0.176 0.091 1.501 
Cash Compt−1 735,152 742,899 579,685  588,750 612,491 484,516 2.087** 
Option Valuet−1 525,161 521,459 649,226  519,122 513,141 542,208 0.119 
Total Compt−1 2,265,832 2,270,042 2,010,153  1,830,345 1,845,581 1,752,685 1.678* 
Portfolio Deltat−1 246,484 248,591 195,741  194,517 184,794 224,865 0.708 
Comp Mixt−1 0.522 0.522 0.536  0.547 0.566 0.532 1.012 
Options Grantedt−1 0.012 0.012 0.026  0.020 0.020 0.022 -0.645 
This table presents the median of the primary variables according to voting outcome as defined in the caption of Panel B. The 
column labeled Difference in Medians presents the z-statistic for a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test of difference in medians 
between Close Passes and Close Fails. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. % For Pay Plan is the percentage of shareholder votes in favor of the pay plan. % For Directors is the number of 
votes for a director divided by the sum of votes for that director and the votes withheld. CEO Tenuret−1 is number of years the 
current CEO has held the CEO title as of the end of the fiscal year prior to the shareholder vote. Revenuet−1 is total revenue in the 
year prior to the shareholder vote. Book-to-markett−1 is the book-to-market ratio measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the 
shareholder vote. ROAt, ROAt−1, ROAt−2 are return on assets, measured as income before interest and taxes scaled by average 
total assets during the year of, the year prior to, and two years prior to the year of the shareholder vote, respectively. Stock 
Returnt, Stock Returnt−1, Stock Returnt−2 are the annual stock returns during the year of, the year prior to, and the two years prior 
to the year of the shareholder vote, respectively. Cash Compt−1 is the CEO’s annual cash compensation (salary plus bonus) during 
the year prior to the shareholder vote. Option Valuet−1 is the Black−Scholes value the CEO’s option grants during the year prior 
to the shareholder vote. Total Compt−1 is the total annual compensation of the CEO during the year prior to the shareholder vote. 
Portfolio Deltat−1 is the change in the risk−neutral value of the CEO’s equity portfolio for a 1% change in stock price as of the 
end of the fiscal year prior to the shareholder vote. Comp Mixt−1 is one minus salary scaled by total annual compensation of the 
CEO during the fiscal year prior to the shareholder vote. Options Grantedt−1 is the aggregate number of options granted scaled by 
the total number of shares outstanding during the fiscal year prior to the shareholder vote. 
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Table I (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Number of Votes by Year and Outcome 
Year 
All 
Votes 
All Passing 
Votes 
All Failing 
Votes  
All Close 
Votes 
Close  
Passes 
Close 
Fails 
2000 874 860 14  29 23 6 
2001 1,037 1,018 19  37 30 7 
2002 1,025 1,003 22  43 36 7 
2003 1,072 1,037 35  46 36 10 
2004 1,102 1,067 35  63 52 11 
2005 925 906 19  33 26 7 
2006 768 751 17  38 30 8 
2007 886 864 22  35 26 9 
2008 986 967 19  32 28 4 
2009 845 835 10  22 20 2 
Total 9,520 9,308 212  378 307 71 
This table presents the number of votes on equity compensation plans during each fiscal year in our sample according to 
outcome. All Votes is the total number of shareholder votes. All Passing Votes is the total number of shareholder votes that 
received more than 50% of the shareholder votes. All Failing Votes is the total number of shareholder votes that received less 
than 50% of the shareholder votes. All Close Votes is the total number of shareholder votes that received between 45% and 55% 
of the shareholder votes. Close Passes is the total number of shareholder votes that received between 50% and 55% of the 
shareholder votes. Close Fails is the total number of shareholder votes that received between 45% and 50% of the shareholder 
votes. 
 
Panel C: Frequency of Voting During Sample Period 
Number of 
Vote Years Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
0  1,002  21.05%  21.05% 
1  1,400  29.42%  50.47% 
2  961  20.19%  70.67% 
3  677  14.23%  84.89% 
4  398  8.36%  93.25% 
5  169  3.55%  96.81% 
6  80  1.68%  98.49% 
7  44  0.92%  99.41% 
8  11  0.23%  99.64% 
9  15  0.32%  99.96% 
10  2  0.04%  100.00% 
Total  4,759 100.00%  
This table presents the frequency with which the 4,759 unique firms (and 24,784 firm-years) in our ISS Voting Analytics sample 
vote on an equity compensation plan during our sample period from 2001 and 2010. The first and second columns report the 
number of times the firm has a vote on an equity compensation plan and the number of firms with that number of votes, 
respectively. The third and fourth columns report the percent of the sample and the cumulative percent having a given number of 
votes during the sample period, respectively.
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Table II 
Shareholder Voting 
 
% For  
Directors 
% For  
Directors  
% For 
Pay Plan 
% For 
Pay Plan 
% For Directors    0.327***  
    (6.719)  
% For Pay Plan 0.113***     
 (5.719)     
Shares Requested 0.048* -0.030  -0.679*** -0.561*** 
 (1.866) (-1.297)  (-5.782) (-15.450) 
Shares Available 0.058 0.017  -0.372*** -0.367*** 
 (1.323) (0.416)  (-4.845) (-5.078) 
Comp Mixt-1 0.001*** 0.000  -0.003*** -0.002*** 
 (3.136) (1.453)  (-5.689) (-6.623) 
Log(Total Compt-1) 0.003 0.002  -0.008** -0.006** 
 (1.017) (0.685)  (-2.007) (-2.158) 
log(CEO Tenuret-1) 0.004*** 0.004***  0.003 0.003 
 (3.266) (4.220)  (1.081) (1.299) 
log(Revenuet-1) -0.026*** -0.029***  -0.012 -0.008* 
 (-5.370) (-6.030)  (-1.418) (-1.659) 
Book-to-markett-1 0.024 0.026**  0.009 -0.035** 
 (1.625) (1.985)  (0.299) (-2.308) 
ROAt-1 -0.034*** -0.030***  0.038 0.020 
 (-5.107) (-5.643)  (1.218) (0.675) 
ROAt-2 -0.004*** -0.005***  -0.007 -0.001 
 (-3.495) (-5.811)  (-1.242) (-0.127) 
Stock Returnt-1 0.005** 0.004**  -0.002 0.001 
 (2.314) (2.033)  (-0.619) (0.352) 
Stock Return t-2 0.794*** 0.895***  0.604*** 0.857*** 
 (48.000) (153.117)  (16.097) (78.391) 
      
Observations 2,221 2,221  2,221 3,070 
R-squared 0.127 0.094  0.174 0.110 
This table presents the results of estimating regressions of either the percentage of votes cast in favor a director (% For 
Directors) or the percentage of votes cast in favor of the pay plan (% For Pay Plan). Shares Requested is the number of shares 
requested by the pay plan scaled by the number of shares outstanding. Shares Available is the number of stock options and 
restricted stock that have not yet been granted scaled by the number of shares outstanding. All of the remaining variables are as 
defined in the caption of Table I. Industry (two-digit SIC) and year indicators are included but unreported. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are calculated based on two-way 
clustering by firm and year.  
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Table III 
Effect of Shareholder Voting: Equity-based Compensation Plans 
 
Panel A: Contemporaneous Compensation Variables 
 
Cash 
Compt 
Option 
Compt 
Total 
Compt 
Portfolio 
Deltat 
Comp  
Mixt 
Options 
Grantedt 
% For Pay Plan -0.053 -2.523*** -0.260* -0.130 -0.169*** -0.013*** 
 (-1.036) (-4.279) (-1.651) (-1.475) (-3.066) (-7.640) 
% For Directors -0.070 -1.511* 0.015 -0.093 0.006 0.000 
 (-0.972) (-1.829) (0.120) (-0.992) (0.195) (0.002) 
Log(CEO Tenuret) -0.002 -0.379*** 0.005 -0.045** -0.017** -0.000 
 (-0.142) (-4.048) (0.424) (-2.540) (-2.364) (-0.307) 
Log(Revenuet) 0.049*** 0.300*** 0.145*** 0.041*** 0.019*** -0.001*** 
 (2.948) (2.974) (5.793) (5.292) (5.438) (-3.628) 
Book-to-markett -0.038** -0.568 -0.106*** -0.091*** -0.014 0.000 
 (-1.970) (-1.508) (-3.108) (-3.242) (-0.825) (0.203) 
ROAt -0.111 -1.360 -0.204 0.137 -0.056 -0.001 
 (-0.967) (-1.380) (-1.014) (1.449) (-1.305) (-0.429) 
ROAt-1 0.069 0.910 -0.046 0.069 0.024 0.002 
 (0.339) (0.995) (-0.400) (0.389) (1.152) (0.223) 
ROAt-2 0.005 -0.681 -0.040 -0.020 -0.031 -0.001 
 (0.036) (-0.990) (-0.265) (-0.358) (-0.544) (-0.122) 
Stock Returnt 0.104** -0.532 0.084*** 0.683*** -0.038*** -0.001 
 (2.526) (-1.408) (3.354) (6.891) (-4.581) (-0.945) 
Stock Returnt-1 -0.001 0.117 0.112** -0.060*** 0.024 -0.001 
 (-0.025) (0.526) (2.518) (-3.229) (1.422) (-1.420) 
Stock Returnt-2 -0.001 -0.120 -0.017 -0.059 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.148) (-1.483) (-0.578) (-1.618) (-0.447) (-0.615) 
Dep. Var.t−1 0.743*** 0.457*** 0.633*** 0.942*** 0.426*** 0.446*** 
 (20.542) (6.069) (13.032) (70.425) (8.660) (10.539) 
       
Observations 3,528 3,528 3,528 3,211 3,523 2,074 
R-squared 0.728 0.467 0.702 0.899 0.404 0.391 
This table presents regressions of the contemporaneous (i.e., for the fiscal year that includes the shareholder meeting) incentive 
compensation variables on pay plan (% For Pay Plan) and director (% For Directors) voting outcomes and determinants of 
incentive compensation. Dep. Vart–1 is the lagged value of the respective dependent variable for the fiscal year prior to the 
shareholder vote. The remaining variables are as defined in the caption to Panel A of Table I. Industry (two-digit SIC) and year 
indicators are included but unreported. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are calculated based on two-way clustering by firm and year.  
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Table III (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: One Year-Ahead Compensation Variables 
 
Cash 
Compt+1 
Option 
Compt+1 
Total 
Compt+1 
Portfolio 
Deltat+1 
Comp 
Mixt+1 
Options 
Grantedt+1 
CEO 
Turnovert+1 
% For Pay Plan -0.065 -1.213** -0.096 -0.165 -0.151*** -0.005 -0.031 
 (-0.823) (-2.057) (-0.650) (-1.261) (-4.592) (-1.628) (-0.642) 
% For Directors -0.249* -2.310 -0.253 0.442 -0.073 -0.005 0.127 
 (-1.732) (-1.516) (-1.412) (0.814) (-0.945) (-1.434) (1.444) 
Log(CEO Tenuret) -0.040*** -0.446** -0.023 -0.020 -0.007 -0.001 0.036*** 
 (-3.418) (-2.030) (-1.132) (-0.533) (-1.021) (-1.221) (5.549) 
Log(Revenuet) 0.064** 0.232*** 0.154*** 0.090*** 0.016*** -0.001** 0.022*** 
 (2.417) (2.844) (8.230) (5.933) (8.811) (-2.422) (2.783) 
Book-to-markett -0.005 -0.558* -0.093** -0.211*** -0.038*** 0.004*** -0.003 
 (-0.180) (-1.918) (-2.158) (-4.432) (-2.886) (3.434) (-0.262) 
ROAt -0.172 0.157 -0.239* 0.153 -0.039 -0.005 -0.029 
 (-1.021) (0.095) (-1.852) (1.011) (-0.632) (-0.850) (-0.688) 
ROAt-1 0.099 -2.217 -0.210 -0.465*** -0.106** 0.003 -0.160*** 
 (0.282) (-1.404) (-0.724) (-3.541) (-1.993) (0.516) (-2.862) 
ROAt-2 -0.070 1.835* 0.132 0.151 0.085* -0.006 0.031 
 (-0.625) (1.688) (0.843) (1.243) (1.748) (-1.091) (0.460) 
Stock Returnt 0.088** 0.317 0.264*** 0.493*** 0.029 -0.001 -0.000 
 (2.248) (1.067) (11.060) (6.480) (1.529) (-0.925) (-0.037) 
Stock Returnt-1 -0.031 0.195 0.067*** -0.026* 0.026*** -0.001 -0.014 
 (-1.436) (0.692) (2.661) (-1.948) (2.679) (-1.303) (-0.983) 
Stock Returnt-2 -0.027** 0.055 -0.024 -0.112* -0.002 0.002* 0.008 
 (-2.136) (0.361) (-0.934) (-1.782) (-0.324) (1.889) (0.800) 
Dep. Var.t−1 0.620*** 0.371*** 0.571*** 0.820*** 0.376*** 0.413***  
 (13.390) (10.548) (19.250) (30.659) (16.350) (8.593)  
        
Observations 2,439 2,439 2,439 2,170 2,433 980 3,045 
R-squared 0.600 0.359 0.654 0.753 0.358 0.339 0.051 
This table presents regressions of the one-year ahead (i.e., for the fiscal year following the year of the shareholder meeting) 
incentive compensation variables on pay plan (% For Pay Plan) and director (% For Directors) voting outcomes and 
determinants of incentive compensation. CEO Turnovert+1 is an indicator for taking the value one if the CEO at the time of filing 
the proxy in year t+1 differs from the CEO at the time of the shareholder meeting in year t, zero otherwise. Dep. Vart−1 is the 
lagged value of the respective dependent variable for the fiscal year prior to the shareholder vote. The remaining variables are as 
defined in the caption to Panel A of Table I. Industry (two-digit SIC) and year indicators are included but unreported. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are calculated based 
on two-way clustering by firm and year.  
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Table III (cont’d) 
 
Panel C: Two Year-Ahead Compensation Variables 
 
Cash 
Compt+2 
Option 
Compt+2 
Total 
Compt+2 
Portfolio 
Deltat+2 
Comp 
Mixt+2 
Options 
Grantedt+2 
CEO 
Turnovert+2 
% For Pay Plan 0.007 0.978 0.104 0.080 -0.014 0.000 0.103 
 (0.074) (1.036) (1.069) (0.734) (-0.378) (0.022) (1.401) 
% For Directors -0.087 -0.718 0.222 -0.149 -0.003 0.022*** 0.295 
 (-0.299) (-0.246) (0.449) (-0.630) (-0.023) (4.705) (1.604) 
Log(CEO Tenuret) -0.046 -0.539** -0.052* -0.094** -0.009 -0.001 0.039* 
 (-1.276) (-2.184) (-1.947) (-2.460) (-0.888) (-1.141) (1.923) 
Log(Revenuet) 0.079* 0.319*** 0.190*** 0.119*** 0.017*** -0.002** 0.034*** 
 (1.895) (2.674) (5.612) (4.779) (3.446) (-2.494) (3.039) 
Book-to-markett 0.055 -0.366 -0.209*** -0.224 -0.067*** -0.001 0.010 
 (0.478) (-0.828) (-2.770) (-1.634) (-2.865) (-0.523) (0.196) 
ROAt -0.452** -1.579 -0.505*** -0.372** -0.109** 0.010*** -0.023 
 (-2.070) (-1.133) (-2.762) (-2.162) (-2.459) (3.374) (-0.500) 
ROAt-1 0.104 -1.569 -0.079 -0.125 -0.046 -0.001 -0.150 
 (0.333) (-0.985) (-0.207) (-0.812) (-0.960) (-0.068) (-1.032) 
ROAt-2 -0.019 1.266 0.043*** 0.096 0.045* -0.017*** -0.082 
 (-0.260) (1.474) (4.509) (0.562) (1.713) (-2.650) (-0.695) 
Stock Returnt 0.031 0.036 0.132* 0.447*** 0.012 -0.001 -0.037* 
 (1.402) (0.163) (1.924) (4.847) (1.274) (-0.561) (-1.647) 
Stock Returnt-1 -0.045 0.334 0.055 -0.085 0.022* 0.001 -0.006 
 (-1.534) (1.461) (1.327) (-1.202) (1.771) (0.125) (-0.343) 
Stock Returnt-2 -0.017 -0.381** -0.034 -0.042 -0.004 -0.001 0.012 
 (-0.707) (-2.325) (-0.730) (-1.086) (-0.441) (-0.748) (0.573) 
Dep. Var.t−1 0.504*** 0.276*** 0.469*** 0.784*** 0.325*** 0.285*** -- 
 (6.993) (8.238) (11.140) (15.576) (11.645) (5.609) -- 
        
Observations 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,027 1,160 325 1,713 
R-squared 0.549 0.366 0.595 0.714 0.365 0.459 0.088 
This table presents regressions of the two year-ahead (i.e., for the second fiscal year following the year of the shareholder 
meeting) incentive compensation variables on pay plan (% For Pay Plan) and director (% For Directors) voting outcomes and 
determinants of incentive compensation. CEO Turnovert+2 is an indicator for taking the value one if the CEO at the time of filing 
the proxy in year t+2 differs from the CEO at the time of the shareholder meeting in year t, zero otherwise Dep. Vart−1 is the 
lagged value of the respective dependent variable for the fiscal year prior to the shareholder vote. The remaining variables are as 
defined in the caption to Panel A of Table I. Industry (two-digit SIC) and year indicators are included but unreported. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are calculated based 
on two-way clustering by firm and year.  
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Table IV 
Effect of Shareholder Voting: Equity-based Compensation Plans  
Instrumental Variables Analysis, One Year-Ahead Compensation Variables 
 
 
Cash 
Compt+1 
Option 
Compt+1 
Total 
Compt+1 
Portfolio 
Deltat+1 
Comp 
Mixt+1 
Options 
Grantedt+1 
CEO 
Turnovert+1 
% For Pay Plan 0.141 0.585 -0.088 -0.241*** -0.115*** -0.004 0.016 
 (1.029) (0.457) (-0.505) (-2.781) (-4.443) (-0.576) (0.150) 
Log(CEO Tenuret) -0.033*** -0.470** -0.030* -0.029 -0.011* -0.002 0.036*** 
 (-3.334) (-2.301) (-1.796) (-0.949) (-1.881) (-1.591) (5.854) 
Log(Revenuet) 0.063*** 0.229*** 0.158*** 0.091*** 0.016*** -0.001*** 0.022*** 
 (2.874) (2.997) (9.332) (7.199) (8.709) (-4.653) (3.336) 
Book-to-markett 0.036 -0.495** -0.072*** -0.194*** -0.035*** 0.003** -0.004 
 (1.524) (-2.077) (-2.986) (-4.079) (-4.140) (2.048) (-0.336) 
ROAt -0.126 0.405 -0.237** 0.127 -0.037 -0.003 -0.061* 
 (-1.002) (0.265) (-2.165) (0.946) (-0.644) (-0.527) (-1.649) 
ROAt-1 0.143 -2.999** -0.260 -0.423*** -0.136*** -0.004 -0.145** 
 (0.536) (-2.049) (-1.315) (-3.069) (-2.750) (-0.713) (-2.567) 
ROAt-2 -0.118 2.296** 0.161 0.119 0.104** -0.001 0.018 
 (-1.233) (2.427) (1.476) (1.426) (2.445) (-0.172) (0.247) 
Stock Returnt 0.104*** 0.333 0.280*** 0.502*** 0.032** -0.002 0.001 
 (3.109) (1.469) (10.444) (7.246) (2.505) (-1.635) (0.130) 
Stock Returnt-1 -0.026 0.275 0.067** -0.026*** 0.029*** -0.002* -0.010 
 (-1.498) (1.125) (2.425) (-2.660) (3.608) (-1.855) (-1.081) 
Stock Returnt-2 -0.032*** 0.094 -0.030 -0.111** -0.002 0.002** 0.007 
 (-2.615) (0.690) (-1.227) (-2.126) (-0.331) (2.512) (0.857) 
Dep. Var.t−1 0.627*** 0.374*** 0.568*** 0.822*** 0.382*** 0.403*** -- 
 (15.985) (11.388) (22.162) (38.212) (17.524) (25.616) -- 
        
Observations 2,568 2,568 2,568 2,285 2,562 1,000 3,205 
R-squared 0.600 0.347 0.650 0.757 0.350 0.322 0.049 
This table presents regressions of the one-year ahead (i.e., for the fiscal year following the year of the shareholder 
meeting) incentive compensation variables on shareholder support for the pay plan (% For Pay Plan) and 
determinants of incentive compensation using an indicator for ISS voting recommendation being “for” the pay plan 
(ISS For Pay Plan) as an instrument for % For Pay Plan. CEO Turnovert+1 is an indicator for taking the value one if the 
CEO at the time of filing the proxy in year t+1 differs from the CEO at the time of the shareholder meeting in year t, zero 
otherwise. Dep. Vart–1 is the lagged value of the respective dependent variable for the fiscal year prior to the 
shareholder vote. The remaining variables are as defined in the caption to Panel A of Table I. Industry (two-digit 
SIC) and year indicators are included but unreported. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are calculated based on two-way clustering by firm and year. 
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Table V 
Regression Discontinuity 
 
Panel A: One Year-Ahead Excess Compensation 
 
Bandwidth 50 Bandwidth 100 Bandwidth 200 
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
Excess log(Cash Compt+1) -0.047 (-0.354) -0.060 (-0.300) 0.002 (0.020) 
Excess log(Option Grant Valuet+1) -0.686 (-0.442) -0.071 (-0.032) -0.815 (-0.689) 
Excess log(Total Compt+1) -0.293 (-1.622) -0.412 (-1.645) -0.172 (-1.227) 
Excess log(Portfolio Deltat+1) 0.086 (0.601) 0.091 (0.498) 0.067 (0.507) 
Excess Comp Mixt+1 -0.083 (-1.500) -0.142** (-1.961) -0.050 (-1.097) 
Excess Options Grantedt+1 -0.008 (-1.001) -0.011 (-0.981) -0.008 (-1.269) 
CEO Turnovert+1 0.098* (1.926) 0.073 (1.097) 0.117** (2.503) 
This table presents the results of local polynomial regressions on either side of the 50% discontinuity in the percentage of votes in 
favor of the pay plan (% For Pay Plan). The compensation-related dependent variables are excess one-year ahead (i.e., for the 
fiscal year following the year of the shareholder meeting) variables defined as the residuals from the regressions in Table IV, 
Panel B. CEO Turnovert+1 is an indicator for taking the value one if the CEO at the time of filing the proxy in year t+1 differs 
from the CEO at the time of the shareholder meeting in year t, zero otherwise. Bandwidths of 50%, 100%, and 200% of the 
default are considered and a triangular kernel is used for the estimation. 
 
Panel B: Two Year-Ahead Excess Compensation 
 
Bandwidth 50 Bandwidth 100 Bandwidth 200 
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
Excess log(Cash Compt+2) 0.185* (1.690) 0.121 (0.899) 0.123 (1.341) 
Excess log(Option Grant Valuet+2) 3.182* (1.703) 3.917 (1.549) 1.080 (0.764) 
Excess log(Total Compt+2) -0.293* (-1.811) -0.198 (-0.934) -0.234* (-1.727) 
Excess log(Portfolio Deltat+2) 1.635** (1.982) 1.742* (1.740) 1.595** (2.221) 
Excess Comp Mixt+2 -0.009 (-0.134) 0.031 (0.367) -0.022 (-0.400) 
Excess Options Grantedt+2 0.006 (0.785) 0.013*** (4.897) -0.000 (-0.008) 
CEO Turnovert+2 0.069 (0.738) -0.028 (-0.215) 0.078 (0.987) 
This table presents the results of local polynomial regressions on either side of the 50% discontinuity in the percentage of votes in 
favor of the pay plan (% For Pay Plan). The compensation-related dependent variables are excess two-year ahead (i.e., for the 
second fiscal year following the year of the shareholder meeting) variables defined as the residuals from the regressions in Table 
IV, Panel C. CEO Turnovert+2 is an indicator for taking the value one if the CEO at the time of filing the proxy in year t+2 differs 
from the CEO at the time of the shareholder meeting in year t, zero otherwise. Bandwidths of 50%, 100%, and 200% of the 
default are considered and a triangular kernel is used for the estimation.  
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Table VI 
Regression Discontinuity 
 
Equity-based Pay Plan Proposals in Subsequent Year 
 
Bandwidth 50 Bandwidth 100 Bandwidth 200 
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
Proposalt+1 -0.559*** (-4.697) -0.578*** (-3.465) -0.416*** (-4.438) 
% For Pay Plant+1 0.020 (0.587) 0.000 (0.001) 0.015 (0.508) 
Shares Requestedt+1  -0.025*** (-3.015) -0.027*** (-2.704) -0.020*** (-3.124) 
Shares Approvedt+1 0.020** (2.232) 0.012 (1.107) 0.015 (1.266) 
This table presents the results of local polynomial regressions on either side of the 50% discontinuity in the percentage of votes in 
favor of the pay plan (% For Pay Plan). Proposalt+1 is an indicator variable for the firm requesting shares in the year after the 
initial request. % For Pay Plant+1 is the level of shareholder support for equity-based pay plans submitted in year t+1. Shares 
Requested is the number of shares requested by the pay plan proposed in t+1 scaled by the number of shares outstanding. Shares 
Approved t+1 equals the sum of shares approved in t and shares requested in t+1. Bandwidths of 50%, 100%, and 200% of the 
default are considered and a triangular kernel is used for the estimation. 
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Table VII 
Effect of Shareholder Voting: Director Elections 
 
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares Analysis 
 
Cash 
Compt+1 
Option 
Compt+1 
Total 
Compt+1 
Portfolio 
Deltat+1 
Comp 
Mixt+1 
Options 
Grantedt+1 
CEO 
Turnovert+1 
% For Director -0.062 -0.070 -0.050 0.168 -0.022 -0.004*** -0.015*** 
 (-1.134) (-0.615) (-0.623) (0.906) (-0.623) (-4.348) (-3.252) 
Log(CEO Tenuret) -0.037*** -0.311** -0.023* -0.009 -0.013*** 0.000 0.002 
 (-4.451) (-2.553) (-1.724) (-0.338) (-3.251) (0.260) (0.904) 
Log(Revenuet) 0.061*** 0.361*** 0.170*** 0.105*** 0.023*** -0.000** 0.001 
 (4.400) (3.259) (8.265) (6.025) (4.314) (-2.515) (1.396) 
Book-to-markett -0.027** -0.503 -0.080*** -0.247*** -0.030** -0.001*** 0.001 
 (-2.009) (-1.326) (-2.736) (-3.898) (-2.246) (-5.678) (0.735) 
ROAt -0.023 0.370 -0.093 0.064 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.000) (0.471) (-0.824) (0.323) (-0.183) (-1.282) (-0.367) 
ROAt-1 -0.117 -1.591* -0.231* -0.219* -0.050 0.000 -0.014 
 (-1.343) (-1.681) (-1.767) (-1.727) (-1.184) (0.091) (-1.121) 
ROAt-2 0.064 0.232 -0.048 0.310 -0.054 -0.006*** -0.018 
 (0.663) (0.335) (-0.878) (1.127) (-1.551) (-2.638) (-1.197) 
Stock Returnt 0.101*** 0.469* 0.237*** 0.488*** 0.020** -0.002*** 0.001 
 (2.779) (1.765) (7.483) (6.823) (2.199) (-2.850) (0.295) 
Stock Returnt-1 -0.031* 0.138 0.045*** -0.078** 0.012** -0.001* -0.000 
 (-1.925) (1.197) (3.489) (-2.101) (2.192) (-1.891) (-0.137) 
Stock Returnt-2 -0.036*** 0.050 -0.024*** -0.135*** 0.000 0.000 0.003** 
 (-3.490) (0.545) (-3.080) (-3.283) (0.045) (0.761) (2.006) 
Dep. Var.t−1 0.643*** 0.400*** 0.580*** 0.830*** 0.355*** 0.359*** -- 
 (16.027) (7.011) (23.755) (21.903) (11.680) (11.692) -- 
        
Observations 60,507 60,507 60,507 55,129 60,311 33,966 73,522 
R-squared 0.616 0.418 0.702 0.574 0.344 0.291 0.010 
This table presents regressions of the one-year ahead (i.e., for the fiscal year following the year of the shareholder meeting) 
incentive compensation variables on shareholder support for directors (% For Director) and determinants of incentive 
compensation for the sample of all director elections. CEO Turnovert+1 is an indicator for taking the value one if the CEO at the 
time of filing the proxy in year t+1 differs from the CEO at the time of the shareholder meeting in year t, zero otherwise. Dep. 
Vart–1 is the lagged value of the respective dependent variable for the fiscal year prior to the shareholder vote. The remaining 
variables are as defined in the caption to Panel A of Table I. Industry (two-digit SIC) and year indicators are included but 
unreported. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors 
are calculated based on two-way clustering by firm and year. 
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Table VII (cont’d) 
Effect of Shareholder Voting: Director Elections 
 
Panel B: Instrumental Variables Analysis 
 Cash 
Compt+1 
Option 
Compt+1 
Total 
Compt+1 
Portfolio 
Deltat+1 
Comp 
Mixt+1 
Options 
Grantedt+1 
CEO 
Turnovert+1 
% For Director 0.116 2.320** 0.240*** 0.350* 0.096*** 0.000 0.020 
 (0.954) (2.190) (2.592) (1.738) (2.853) (0.280) (1.525) 
Log(CEO Tenuret) -0.036*** -0.306*** -0.022* -0.009 -0.013*** 0.000 0.002 
 (-4.601) (-2.688) (-1.751) (-0.355) (-3.392) (0.308) (0.947) 
Log(Revenuet) 0.061*** 0.362*** 0.170*** 0.104*** 0.023*** -0.000*** 0.001 
 (4.636) (3.522) (8.858) (6.395) (4.642) (-2.771) (1.430) 
Book-to-markett -0.026** -0.482 -0.078*** -0.246*** -0.029** -0.001*** 0.002 
 (-2.084) (-1.373) (-2.895) (-4.155) (-2.374) (-5.716) (1.001) 
ROAt -0.029 0.318 -0.100 0.062 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.000) (0.428) (-0.938) (0.341) (-0.284) (-1.429) (-0.328) 
ROAt-1 -0.119 -1.608* -0.234* -0.219* -0.051 0.001 -0.014 
 (-1.527) (-1.857) (-1.949) (-1.855) (-1.314) (0.111) (-1.216) 
ROAt-2 0.067 0.254 -0.044 0.311 -0.053 -0.006*** -0.018 
 (0.751) (0.396) (-0.843) (1.218) (-1.627) (-2.891) (-1.290) 
Stock Returnt 0.101*** 0.463* 0.237*** 0.489*** 0.020** -0.003*** 0.001 
 (3.022) (1.934) (8.236) (7.377) (2.367) (-3.108) (0.275) 
Stock Returnt-1 -0.031** 0.147 0.045*** -0.077** 0.012** -0.001** -0.000 
 (-2.090) (1.391) (3.738) (-2.222) (2.524) (-2.046) (-0.097) 
Stock Returnt-2 -0.036*** 0.052 -0.024*** -0.136*** 0.000 0.000 0.003** 
 (-3.787) (0.611) (-3.307) (-3.608) (0.068) (0.857) (2.122) 
Dep. Var.t−1 0.643*** 0.401*** 0.581*** 0.830*** 0.356*** 0.360*** -- 
 (16.829) (7.532) (25.271) (23.519) (12.528) (12.826) -- 
        
Observations 60,447 60,447 60,447 55,071 60,251 33,964 73,452 
This table presents regressions of contemporaneous (i.e., for the fiscal year that includes the shareholder meeting) incentive 
compensation variables on shareholder support for directors (% For Directors) and determinants of incentive compensation for 
the sample of all director elections using an indicator for ISS voting recommendation being “for” the director (ISS For Director) 
as an instrument for % For Director. CEO Turnovert+1 is an indicator for taking the value one if the CEO at the time of filing the 
proxy in year t+1 differs from the CEO at the time of the shareholder meeting in year t, zero otherwise. Dep. Vart–1 is the lagged 
value of the respective dependent variable for the fiscal year prior to the shareholder vote. The remaining variables are as defined 
in the caption to Panel A of Table I. Industry (two-digit SIC) and year indicators are included but unreported. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are calculated based on 
two-way clustering by firm and year. 
 
 
 
